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  Anaphora:  lexico-textual structure, or means for utterance integration 
within a discourse?  A critique of the Functional Grammar account1  
(Linguistics 40 (3), June 2002, pp. 469-493) 
 
 Francis Cornish, CNRS UMR 5610 and Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 
France 
 
Abstract 
 
 This article is a critical examination of Dik’s (1997b: ch. 10) account of discourse 
anaphora, within the framework of the theory of Functional Grammar (but it highlights 
features of anaphora theory which hold more generally).  I show first that Dik’s definitions of 
the phenomenon involve two contradictory conceptions of this discourse procedure (the 
anaphor refers to a mental representation of its referent within a mental model of the ongoing 
discourse, yet at the same time needs first to connect up with a segment of co-text - its 
linguistic antecedent); second, that Dik’s account of the relationship between given 
(pronominal) anaphor types and the “entity-order” of their potential referents is both too rigid 
and too narrow;  and third, that his description of the underlying structure of anaphors, which 
includes both the referential index of their actual referent/antecedent and a variable 
specifying the latter’s entity-order, does not allow for the necessary flexibility and dynamic 
character of anaphor use and interpretation.  A discursively more realistic account of 
discourse anaphora needs to specify the necessary interaction between ‘bottom-up’ factors of 
these kinds, on the one hand, and ‘top-down’ relationships involving the wider discourse 
context, on the other.  This is what I briefly outline at the end of the article.  
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
  In the most recent two-volume presentation of the standard theory of 
Dikian Functional Grammar, Dik (1997b) devotes a whole chapter to anaphora 
(both sentence and discourse anaphora) (ch. 10), and a further chapter to an 
outline of an approach to discourse (ch. 18). Anaphora figures prominently 
throughout the current development of Functional Grammar (henceforth FG) as 
a whole - for example, in its account of relative clauses, and in its definitions of 
the variables marking each of the different layers within underlying clause 
structure: indeed, the possibility of distinctive anaphoric reference to each of 
these layers provides important evidence in favour of their independence.   The 
opening up of the originally clause-bound model to discourse which is now 
being undertaken is developing in parallel with a concern for anaphora2 .  This 
is only natural, since anaphora and deixis at the discourse level are an important 
means of coordinating the attention of the discourse participants, as well as of 
converting text into discourse (and vice versa from the speaker’s point of view, 
of course).   
 This is why I think now is a good time to examine the current (still 
programmatic) FG approach to anaphora, as set forth in Dik (1997b: ch. 10), 
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and to see to what extent it can be situated within what is now known about 
discourse and anaphora generally. I will discuss three basic issues raised by 
Dik’s account, and which may be seen to be relevant generally, whatever the 
approach to anaphora and reference in discourse.   These are as follows:   
 
 1)  The very fundamental question of the nature of the anaphoric relation 
(i.e. whether it is necessarily mediated by the prior mention (that is, “use”) of an 
antecedent expression in the co-text or not);   
 
 2)  The relation between the form of an anaphor and the potential 
entity-order(s) of its referent;  and  
 
 3)  The formalism used by Dik to represent anaphors in underlying clause 
structure, and the (necessarily) dynamic relationship between anaphors, their 
containing predication, and the utterance containing a relevant 
“antecedent-trigger”.   
 
 We shall see that these three issues are closely linked.   In what follows, I 
devote a section (respectively, sections 2, 3 and 4) to each of these basic 
questions.  
 
2.  The current FG view of anaphora 
 
Dik (1997b: ch. 10) rightly distinguishes between “the underlying anaphorical 
(sic) relation” and “its formal expression” (p. 215).  He then attempts to define 
well-formedness conditions for anaphora in functional terms.   Dik gives what I 
would argue are two different definitions of anaphora, cited below as 
Definitions I and II, respectively. 
 
Anaphora : Dik’s (1997b: 215) Definition I 
 
“I speak of anaphora as occurring when an element of underlying clause structure refers to an 
entity which has already been established, directly or indirectly, in the preceding discourse 
(discourse  anaphora) or is being  established in the same clause (sentence anaphora).”    
 
Anaphora : Dik’s (1997b: 216) Definition II 
 
“...The expression with which the entity in question [i.e. the referent] has been or is being 
established in the discourse is the antecedent  of the anaphorical (sic) element. (...)  The 
relation between  anaphoric element and antecedent will be called an anaphorical relation.”. 
 
 I view these definitions as involving two distinct conceptions of the 
anaphoric relation involved here: in the first (Definition I), the anaphor refers to 
an entity (or more accurately, to the mental representation of an entity as 
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evoked via the preceding discourse) which is already established in the 
addressee’s discourse model - this is what would most commonly be called 
nowadays a discourse referent; but in the second conception (Definition II), the 
relata involved are the antecedent (a co-occurring linguistic expression) and the 
anaphor. 
 In Dik’s Principle (ii) (p. 215), he states that “All anaphors have an 
antecedent in the discourse.  The antecedent itself is not used anaphorically, but 
it serves to establish some entity in the discourse.”    
 Before we proceed any further, I think we need a definition of the notions 
of text and discourse.  This is given under (1) below. 
 
(1)  Text  vs. discourse 
Text denotes the connected sequence of verbal signs and non-verbal signals in terms 
of which discourse is co-constructed by the participants in the act of communication.  
  
 Discourse denotes the hierarchically structured, situated sequence of utterance and 
 illocutionary acts carried out in pursuance of some communicative goal, as integrated 
 within a given context.   
 
The context is subject to an ongoing process of construction and revision as the 
discourse unfolds.  (My definitions - FC; see Cornish, 1999: subsection 2.3 for further 
development and illustration of this distinction, and its importance for the study of 
discourse anaphora).   
 
Text, then, is the tangible, perceptible record of at least one utterance act 
(whether realised in terms of a verbal, linguistic trace or of a non-verbal trace - 
which may be gestural, sensory-perceptual or prosodic). The discourse partners 
make use of this record, in conjunction with their invocation of a relevant 
context, in order to create discourse. The distinction is close to that drawn 
recently within an FG context by van den Berg (1998) between the concepts of 
utterance  and message (structure), and in a “text worlds” context by Werth 
(1999: 46, 302)3 .  So when Dik says that “all anaphors have an antecedent in 
the discourse”, he no doubt means “text”.   His Definition I, on the other hand, 
is framed within the context of “discourse” (according to my definition  (1)). 
 Under Dik’s conception of anaphora, it is necessary for there to be a 
previous mention in the surrounding co-text of the entity referred to by an 
anaphor, and it is this mention which constitutes the antecedent (i.e. a linguistic 
expression used in the co-text of some anaphor).    
 But prior mention is in reality neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for the existence of anaphora - as indeed Dik himself suggests in 
formulating his first conception of anaphora (Definition I above), when he 
writes that “an element of underlying clause structure refers to an entity which 
has already been established, directly or indirectly, in the previous discourse” 
(my emphasis). If we take discourse seriously, as Dik claims to do (particularly 
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in his chapter 18 devoted to this topic), then it is clear that naturally-occurring 
discourse1 is full of instances where there exists a mutually assumed discourse 
referent which is retrieved by a given anaphor, without that referent having 
been explicitly introduced into the discourse by a prior mention.    
 Let us look at the examples under (2) below. In order to be felicitous (i.e. 
coherent), these instances of implicit or indirect anaphora all require that some 
kind of connection be available for the addressee to be able to retrieve the 
correct, intended referent.     
 
(2) a  [Context: a neighbour’s father has been in hospital for a week already] 
 Anne to her neighbour, seeing her looking haggard:  How is he? 
 
(2a) trades on the existence of certain specific prior knowledge shared by the 
interactants (in their episodic memories). We may assume that the subject of the 
neighbour’s father’s health has been intensely discussed over the past days, and 
so is constantly at the forefront of the neighbours’ consciousness. The trigger of 
that discourse domain is Anne’s seeing her neighbour looking haggard and 
immediately realising the reason for it.  
 
(2)  b The high street bank on the corner has been broken into twice this  
 month.  But they only took the small change. 
 [they  =  ‘the bank-robbers’] 
 
In (2b), it is the stereotypical knowledge frame evoked via the initial sentence 
(a bank break-in), making available a slot for the perpetrators of the act, which 
motivates the indirect anaphoric reference: the default reference realised via the 
type, “indefinite” pronoun they.  The speaker cannot assume that the addressee 
has any particular individuals in mind at the point of use; but their non-specific 
existence is nonetheless assumed.    
    
(2)  c    [Context : Mary and Barbara are discussing Sarah, who Mary knows  
well but who Barbara has only met once] 
   Mary:  She’s always so good-humoured, you know ...but HE’s a bore.. 
   [HE =  ‘Sarah’s husband/partner’] 
 
In (2c), there is obviously an abductive, or backward-looking inference needed 
to instantiate (i.e. accommodate) a referent not hitherto presupposed to exist.  
The reference of HE here is deictic (or anaphorico-deictic), not strictly 
anaphoric:  a contrastive pitch-accent on this pronoun is required in order for 
the reference to have any chance of succeeding.  The focus structure applied to 
the predicative content of the two clauses clearly indicates a contrast between 
                                            
1
  For example, conversations, interviews, meetings, letters, sports commentaries, and so on 
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the personalities of the two individuals concerned, both pronouns occurring in 
parallel subject position in their respective clauses.  This use also trades on the 
assumption of the addressee’s knowledge of a “frame” - here, that of the 
“couple” - in order to introduce a representation of Sarah’s partner into the 
addressee’s discourse model. 
 
(2) d   [Context:  a young goat wanders through the open front door] 
  A to B, observing the event in fascination: What do you think it’s 
  looking for?    
 
In (2d), the key factor in the exophoric use of the pronoun is the co-presence of 
the referent in the situational context, and the fact that the discourse partners are 
focussing on this unexpected event which is immediately attracting their 
attention. 
 
(2) e   [Context : Woman returning from country walk where she had 
 intended to pick blackberries.  Local retired man sitting on log 
 observing her walk back with empty box] 
 Man :  So you didn’t find any ø, then ?    
  
Finally, (2e) trades upon a forward-looking inference based on the man’s 
observation of the scene, and on his knowledge of the common plans of action 
as well as motivations which people in society typically have.   
 Apart from (2c) where the reference is deictic (or anaphorico-deictic), all 
these instances are cases of anaphora, where the anaphor is intended to pick up 
a representation of a referent assumed by the speaker to be accessible and 
salient to the addressee at the point in the discourse where that anaphor occurs.  
But in no case is there a prior explicit “mention” of the intended referent. Note 
that in all types of anaphora, there is a (semantic/pragmatic) connection of one 
kind or other between what I call the antecedent trigger2  and a relevant salient 
discourse representation.  In discourse anaphora, the antecedent trigger is an 
utterance token, a gesture or percept which evokes or boosts a given mental 
representation of a state of affairs (SoA) into speaker’s and addressee’s current 
discourse models.   
 One other very important factor in the operation of anaphora is the nature 
of the anaphoric predication3 :  that is, what is predicated of the referent of the 
anaphor (which may still be unascertainable at the point when it is uttered) acts 
as a pointer towards a referent of a certain type;  in other words, it places a 
                                            
2
  See Cornish (1999:§2.4.1) for justification for and illustration of this construct. 
3
  Cornish (1999: ch.3) examines in detail various key aspects of this predication (termed there the 
indexical segment) and their role in the functioning of anaphora. 
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semantico-pragmatic constraint on its potential values.  A pair of examples 
presented in Wilson (1992) makes the point very clearly: 
 
(3) a  Sean Penn attacked a photographer.   The man was quite badly hurt. 
     b  Sean Penn attacked a photographer.  The man must be deranged. 
 
Here, each anaphoric predication most naturally continues the perspective 
involving a different discourse referent mutually available to the speech 
partners at the point where the definite subject NP of the second sentence 
occurs - a term which is semantically appropriate for retrieving either of these 
referents.  Note, though, that if we replace these two occurrences of the man  by 
the pronoun he, the first but not the second becomes slightly unnatural.  This is 
due to the preference for subjects, but not non-subjects, to be construed as 
topics, as well as to the restriction of unaccented third person pronouns to 
referents which are highly discourse-active.  However, (4) below shows that the 
anaphoric predication does not always perform an orienting function with 
regard to the choice of a suitable referent for the anaphor 4  : 
 
(4)   Maryi  told Janej that shei/j would have to see a doctor. 
   
     In all these examples, the anaphoric predication continues one aspect of 
the mental scene evoked via the context.  So it seems, on the basis of an 
observation of real discourse in specific contexts of utterance (as opposed to 
careful, invented one- or two-sentence examples where there is an explicit prior 
mention of the intended referent), that prior mention is but one way in which a 
given referent may enter the addressee’s discourse model, justifying its later 
re-accessing via an appropriate anaphor.     
Prior mention is of course normatively required in careful written genres 
of discourse, and linguists studying anaphora have in the past tended to base 
their analyses on invented mini-texts which have a definitely “written” feel 
about them.   But are we justified in extrapolating from normative, written prose 
to the entire range of discourse in characterising the anaphoric relation?    In my 
view, we are not, and the observation of a wide range of discourse genres5 
seems to suggest a rather different model of anaphora from the traditional one 
whereby an anaphor (typically a pronoun of some kind) has first to be paired 
                                            
4
  Note however the slight difference in the sense of the matrix verb told  under each interpretation of the 
out-of-context ambiguous pronoun she  in (4): where the NP Mary is understood as being coreferential with she, 
it has the sense “informed”;  but where the NP Jane is coreferential with the pronoun, told  has a value close to 
“ordered”, “enjoined” (as in Mary told Jane to see a doctor, where only the second of the two interpretations 
indicated above is possible, the anaphor being the zero ‘subject’ of see a doctor).   
5
  See McCawley (1991), Oakhill & Garnham (1992), and Cornish (1997) for presentations and analyses 
of corpora of attested utterances from a range of genres and registers, in connection with an account of 
discourse anaphora. 
       7 
with a co-occurring antecedent expression to enable its full sense and reference 
values to be instantiated.     
    There is, then, a tension, it seems to me, between the two conceptions 
of anaphora (reference via an “antecedent expression” available in the co-text, 
and reference in terms of a discourse representation of an entity of some kind) 
which Dik simultaneously entertains.  And on p. 220, Dik states that “the form 
of the anaphoric element varies according as the antecedent entity is a 
first-order entity, a second-order SoA, or a propositional content” (my 
emphasis).  Here, it seems, the two conceptions of anaphora distinguished 
earlier are conflated into a single weave, with the concept of “antecedent 
entity”.  Dik is guilty of a similar confusion as well as of contravening his own 
principle (i) (p, 217), namely that “the anaphor does not refer to the 
antecedent”, in saying on p. 228:  “In all these cases, the anaphorical element 
refers to an antecedent which is a full speech act”.  Anaphors can of course 
refer to speech acts, but a speech act is not an antecedent (i.e. an “expression”, 
in Dik’s sense). Dik’s (traditional) conception of the antecedent further loses its 
force when he notes the possibility of an anaphor referring to a sub-topic 
inferable from the entity introduced by the “antecedent”, as in the examples of 
“associative anaphora” he presents: 
 
(5) a   On a bench in a park he saw an elderly couple.   The man....The  
 woman... 
      b  John bought a book, but after reading the first few pages he threw it 
 away.   (Dik, 1997b: exs. (2a,b), ch.10) 
 
Here, the notion of antecedent-trigger would seem more appropriate to 
characterise the role of the NPs an elderly couple and the book: that is, as 
introducing into a discourse a number of entities which may later be retrieved 
via an appropriate anaphor. 
  The fact (specifically highlighted by Dik in his discussion of the various 
types of anaphoric expression and their discourse-pragmatic roles: cf. § 10.3.1 
“Pragmatic factors”) that each separate sub-type of anaphor bears a distinctive 
bundle of semantic and referential properties means that they are not simply the 
passive recipient of a sense and reference assigned derivatively by a lexically 
fuller co-occurring expression (the antecedent); instead, they are actively 
responsible for the accessing of a referent or a denotation which has certain 
consequences both for the current interpretation of the wider discourse segment 
in which antecedent-trigger and anaphoric predication co-occur, and for the 
subsequent direction of the discourse to follow.     
 The notion of antecedent expression is also perhaps motivated by the 
convenience (in evidence since the advent of TG) of annotating linguistic 
segments in an example for same or different indices (marking coreference vs. 
non-coreference).  But as pointed out by Lambrecht (1994) in connection with 
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the similar annotating of linguistic segments in terms of their Topic or Focus 
functions, this is not always either feasible or perspicuous.    
 
3.   Anaphor type and entity-order 
    
 Dik’s major concern within the body of the chapter, though, is with the 
entity order types of referent which an anaphor may have - thus with the first 
conception of anaphora mentioned earlier. Indeed, he is concerned here not with 
the linguistic identity of segments (antecedent segment in the co-text and the 
segment corresponding to the anaphor), but with the various forms of the 
anaphors concerned in relation to the ontological (and discourse) status of the 
referents of those anaphors. 
 Two parameters determine the use of a particular anaphor type in a 
discourse. They are (a) the functioning of the anaphor with respect to the 
discourse status of its intended referent, assumed already to be present in that 
discourse - the formation of different “chains” of anaphors (definite or 
demonstrative NPs, pronouns of different types: definite ordinary pronouns, 
demonstrative pronouns (this  vs. that), zeros, etc.)  according as the status of 
the referent is foregrounded or backgrounded at the stage which the discourse 
has reached when the anaphor is used6 .  And (b) the ontological nature (in 
terms of entity-order) of the referent assumed by the use of particular types 
of anaphors (only pronouns are discussed in this context).    
 But in this latter respect, is there really a one-to-one relationship between 
type of pronoun and type of entity-order of its assumed referent, as Dik implies 
there is?  That is, one  = ‘property (fi)’
7 , him/her/it = ‘spatial entity (xi)’, the 
X-ing  (where X is a verb), or, presumably, it/that,  = ‘SoA  (ei)’, so  = ‘possible 
fact (Xi)’, and this/that orthis/that N, where N is an illocutionary noun = 
‘illocution (or perlocution) (Ei)’. Presumably, the pronoun there would be given 
Mackenzie’s (1992) ‘p’ variable (for ‘place’), and then  ‘t’, for ‘time’. Dik 
(1997b: 220) is a bit too rigid, to my mind, on the relationship (which he sees as 
fixed) between given anaphor types and given entity-order denotations8 :  for 
while the personal pronouns he/she/they  and their variant forms do indeed have 
first-order referents, the pronoun it  may refer to a range of entity types, in 
addition to the second-order SoA illustrated in his example (12b): 
                                            
6
   See Cornish (1998) for a discussion of Dik’s conception of the structure of “anaphoric chains” in 
discourse, and the analysis of a short English newspaper article in terms of it. 
7
   Personally, I think ‘type’ is a better characterisation of the potential denotations of one. 
8
   This is in essence the same point that Liedtke (1998:111) makes in connection with Dik’s view of the 
relationship between sentence form (mood types: declarative, interrogative, imperative and exclamative) and 
type of illocutionary force (assertion/statement, question, command, exclamation), Dik assuming a direct, 
one-to-one correlation between the various mood or sentence types, on the one hand, and the respective 
illocutionary force types, on the other.  As analogously in the case of the relation between pronoun form-types 
and entity-order types, Liedtke argues in favour of a much looser, non-deterministic relation between sentence 
form-types and the potential illocutionary forces which they may be used to express.  
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(6)    John saw  [Bill win]i  and Peter saw iti /thati too.   (Dik’s annotations) 
 
It  may have a first-order referent (either inanimate as in ‘the table’, or animate:  
animals, insects etc., plants...or even human: babies).   But it can also have third 
order referents (propositional contents): 
 
(7)  Jack said he’d just won £30, 000 on the lottery, though Mary didn’t believe 
it.  (My example)  
 
In some cases, it may have a Ø-order ‘property’ referent.  This depends largely 
on the type of host verb (in (8), it is verbs of appearance which are illustrated) 
which acts as predicator in the anaphoric clause: 
               
(8)   Mary said she felt weak and ill.   She certainly {looked /sounded} it. 
              
This and other examples shows that the type of entity order denoted by a given 
anaphor is only a preference: it can be overridden by various properties of the 
anaphoric predication as a whole, amongst other factors, particularly by those of 
the host predicator. 
 The pronoun so can also have as referent other entity-order types than the 
propositional content one claimed to be the case by Dik, and which he 
illustrated in his example (12c): 
 
(9)  John thought that [Bill would win]i  and Peter thought soi too . 
 
It may denote a manner, as in the proclitic occurrences so-arranged, so-called, 
etc. See also the indefinite determiner such. I would say that so retrieves 
intensional ‘type’ referents (nonpresupposed propositional contents), whereas it 
prototypically has as potential referents ones which have extensionality, or are 
propositions that have been mutually validated by the discourse partners:  they 
can be treated as (actual) facts for the purposes of the ensuing discourse, not as 
“possible facts”, which is, I believe, why Dik considers so  to have this kind of 
reference.  So is indefinite and intensional (and not fully nominal, rather it is 
adverbial), whereas it is both definite and extensional, as well as being fully 
nominal in character (see Cornish, 1992 for further evidence in favour of these 
analyses). 
 The distal demonstrative pronoun that can refer to four of the five types 
of entity order isolated by Dik: entity order 1 (inanimate entities), as in (10B): 
 
(10) A:  I’m going to cook cous-cous tonight.      
       B:  Really?  I’ve never liked that. 
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Entity order 2 (SoAs): 
 
(11)  [Child puts hand near flames coming from coal fire] 
 Parent:  Johnny, don’t DO that! 
 
Entity order 3:  Propositional content: 
 
(12)   A:  Did you see in the paper that the prime minister has called a  
      General Election for next month? 
 B:  What?  I didn’t know that/That’s incredible!    
 
Entity order 4:  Illocutions (and potentially also, perlocutions): 
 
(13)  Mother-in-law to daughter-in-law :We’re coming to visit you next  
  Sunday. 
 Daughter-in-law (jokingly):  Is that a threat or a promise?! 
 
Distal that, unlike its proximal counterpart, has a preference for use in negative, 
distancing contexts, or where the referent is conceived as a hypothetical, not an 
actual, object or situation. It also has (due to its demonstrative character) a 
definite focussing effect in relation to it, its unaccented counterpart. Its 
proximal counterpart this, which has exactly the same range of denotation types 
as that, can be used to encapsulate a whole segment of discourse and to treat it 
as a compacted entity which is to be the topic of a new discourse segment. 
 It is, in the last analysis, the properties of the anaphoric predication which 
determine the actual entity order of the pronoun’s referent. First and foremost 
among these is the nature of the host predicator.  That is, verb of cognition  or 
propositional attitude  (e.g. believe)  +  it  --> ‘Xi’;  activity verb (e.g. do) + it  
--> ‘ei’;  appearance verb  (e.g. look) + it  --> ‘fi’; It + illocutionary predicator  
(e.g. be a lie/threat) --> ‘Ei’.  Note that, where a sub-class of propositional 
attitude verbs (such as guess, imagine, know) is constructed with so as 
propositional anaphor rather than with it, the semantic status of the verb 
changes:  it no longer has its full lexical sense, but takes on a parenthetical, 
non-assertive semantic value whereby the speaker withholds a full commitment 
to the truth of the proposition accessed via the pronoun (see Cornish, 1992 for 
fuller discussion of this issue). 
 
4.    The formalism used by Dik to represent anaphors, and the three-way 
relationship between anaphor type, anaphoric predication, and discourse 
context 
 
 The formalism which Dik adopts in representing the underlying structure 
of anaphors is problematic. Anaphors are indexicals: language-particular 
       11 
form-types, each of which possesses a specific set of semantico-referential 
properties.  Where pronominal in character, they encode values in respect of the 
categories of person, number, gender, case, definiteness as well as features like 
‘already categorised’ vs. ‘not categorised/uncategorisable’ - a value coded by 
the neuter pronouns in particular, in languages such as French, German, 
Spanish and those from the Slavic family.  These properties derive from the 
language system, and so may legitimately be claimed to be included in 
underlying clause representations (where a given anaphor has been selected 
from the Lexicon together with its term frame structure).     
 But Dik also represents in the structures underlying anaphors (a) the 
variable symbolising the entity order of their actual referent, and (b) the index 
of that referent as encoded in a co-occurring underlying clause structure 
(presumably where there is no syntactic, semantic or pragmatic restriction 
inhibiting this relationship).   (14) provides a sample of Dik’s representations of 
anaphors. 
 
(14)  Dik’s (1997b: ch. 10) underlying representations of a sample of anaphors 
 
 one  : (Afi) 
 it     : (Axi) or (Aei) 
 the X-ing  :  (Aei) 
 so  : (AXi) 
 that/that N (illocution) : (AEi) 
 
(15) presents a sample representation of an underlying two-clause mini-text, 
where an anaphor (here so) is resolved. 
 
(15)  Representation of example (9) (simplified) 
 
 think  (John)  (Xi : [Bill would win]) and 
 think (Peter) (AXi) too   (Dik, 1997b, ch. 10, ex. (33)) 
 
But, with the exception of pronoun types such as one and the third-person 
personal pronouns, which unambiguously encode a particular entity-order type 
of denotation, these potential features of a given anaphor are not 
system-determined (unlike the grammatical features mentioned a moment ago); 
instead, they are discourse-determined. There must therefore be a meshing 
between the output of the rules governing the construction of underlying clause 
structures, on the one hand, and the effect of the principles, tendencies etc. 
which regulate the construction of discourse, on the other - contextual reference 
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being clearly part of the latter9 .   In the case of entity-order type denotation, as 
we saw earlier, the range of entity orders which a given anaphor may have is 
constrained, not wholly by rules of clause structure (as Dik’s representations 
seem to assume), but also, and mainly, by principles of discourse structure 
framed within the meta-principle of interpretative coherence.      
 This may be seen in examples like (3a,b) above, where the same 
anaphoric form (the man) was able to have two different referents evoked via    
an identical antecedent-trigger predication (the initial sentences of each 
example) depending on which one was the target of a predication by the 
anaphoric clause as a whole (that is, in (3a), “having been quite badly hurt (in 
the circumstances previously evoked)”, and in (3b), “needing to be deranged (to 
have done such a thing)”).   We cannot begin to know what the actual referent 
of a given anaphor might be until we have access to the discourse as well as to 
its context.  That is, to determine a given anaphor’s intended referent, we need 
to take discourse pragmatics on board.10  The contradiction which I raised in 
section 2 of this article between the conception of anaphora as involving a 
quasi-grammatical correlation between an antecedent expression in surrounding 
discourse and an anaphor (a relationship manifested in the sharing of indices 
between the two expressions), and the view of anaphora as involving the 
retrieval of a salient discourse representation encoded in the discourse partners’ 
current discourse model, makes itself felt here.  In fact, the coindexing device 
used by Dik is only feasible where there is a candidate antecedent expression in 
the surrounding co-text. Where there is not - as in the cases of exophora 
illustrated in (2a,b,d and e), which I would argue are the basic instances of 
anaphora -, this device is totally inoperative, the relationship here being of 
necessity between a salient discourse representation and an anaphoric 
expression, and not between two isolatable co-occurring expressions.  
 The index of a given referent (whether it be an argument, a predicate, 
predication, proposition or clause) should not, in my view, already be marked as 
                                            
9
    Others have argued in favour of a “division of labour” between pragmatic principles which are separate 
from the clause grammar (and which deal with such phenomena as topic-focus assignment and illocutionary 
force specification, and which have a determining influence on grammatical coding), and the grammatical rules 
and constraints which govern morpho-syntactic form, the province of a “grammatical module” (see in particular 
Van den Berg, 1998, for an elaboration of such a framework which takes account of the specifics of the FG 
model of grammar). 
10
   At the presentation of the paper on which this article is based, Co Vet suggested that since FG clause 
derivations are production-oriented (that is, object-language expressions are derived from the speaker’s point of 
view), it is natural that co-indexing for coreference should be marked in underlying clause structures; after all, 
the speaker usually knows in advance whether or not a given anaphor corefers with some other clausal 
constituent.   This is no doubt true.   However, I believe it is largely irrelevant in the context of discourse, since 
at this level, a speaker, in order successfully to refer, has to get his addressee to establish the intended reference 
(or the intended correlation between two or more identical acts of reference in the case of anaphors); that is, 
reference is a cooperative affair, not something carried out by only one of the discourse partners.  In addition, 
even if the speaker were conceivable as an autonomous, independent discourse agent (which I do not believe he 
could be), it is still the case that his acts of reference only take place dynamically, in a discourse context. They 
could not be accounted for already within the Lexicon, i.e. hors  usage. 
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such in the representation of the anaphoric term, as Dik maintains it should be.  
After all, in the case of discourse anaphora, coreference or non-coreference is 
not something which is automatically assigned, as it may well be in 
grammaticalised instances of anaphora (sentence anaphora):  for example, in 
infinitival subject control, relative clauses, reflexive predications, and so on.  
Here, the choice of index (i.e. co-referent) for a given anaphor is more or less 
fully determined by the syntactico-predicative context in which the anaphor 
occurs.  I therefore believe that this index should not be specified in anaphoric 
terms at the level of the clause realisation:  a given anaphor is selected with its 
term structure frame directly from the Lexicon, where of course no indication of 
its actual reference can possibly be marked.  This occurs only when the text 
constituted by a clause structure (in combination with surrounding clause 
structures) is converted into discourse by being integrated with a context. It 
should be left up to the (as yet unspecified) discourse component or domain of 
the model to provide heuristics for specifying the index (but see the tentative 
suggestions at the end of this section  as to how this might be done). 
 (16) below is an attempt to give more detailed specifications of the 
structures underlying given anaphor types (as contained in the Lexicon). 
 
(16)  Proposal for revision of method of representing the structure underlying 
 anaphors (prior to their discourse resolution) in FG     
 
 it    :  (d1 A!: <inanimate> (!)) 
 so   :  (i Af/X: <intensional> (f/X)) 
          that  : (dist A!: <inanimate> (!)) 
 he    : (d1 Ax: <human> & <male> (x)) 
 they :  (d/i m Ax: <set> (x)) 
 
The ‘A’ symbol (designating an anaphoric predicate) constitutes an instruction 
to the addressee to look for a prior discourse entity whose representation can 
match the features already specified in the anaphor.  Particularly important here 
is the selection restriction imposed on a potential referent for the anaphor (see 
Cornish, 1999:§3.2.2 for some discussion).  That is, the referent (which is not 
automatically yielded by the anaphor qua (potentially) referring expression) is 
viewed as an argument to the essentially predicative conditions contained 
within the anaphor.  As in the case of a canonical predicate, the selection 
restriction carried by a given anaphor type constrains the possible choice of an 
argument/referent which will ‘saturate’ it, thereby giving rise to a potential 
secondary reference, just as the saturation of a predicate by one or more 
arguments gives rise to a potential predication. The ‘!’ variable in the 
representations of the pronouns it and that ranges over the five entity-order 
types recognised so far in FG (as already indicated, however, we need to make 
allowance for more than this number).   
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 Under this conception of anaphor resolution, then, there are three distinct 
stages in the process (see also the algorithms for discourse anaphor resolution 
presented, for example, in Asher & Wada, 1988, and in Walker, 1998): 
 
1. A given anaphor type is selected from the Lexicon to fill the argument 
position of a predicator, and an anaphoric clause is formed. 
 
2. A ‘co-composition’ (Pustejovsky, 1995) process is triggered, whereby 
certain relevant properties of the anaphoric clause as a whole are combined: the 
semantic class of the predicator assigns a denotational category to the anaphor, 
the predicator and its “internal” argument(s) are combined, then the output of 
this combination is integrated with the clause’s referential features (its aspect, 
tense, mood and modality assignments).  These features collectively assign an 
entity order type to the anaphor. See Cornish (1999: ch.3) for some 
development of these relationships.   
 Where this is not already specified unambiguously (as in the case of 
this/that, it, so, etc.), then the entity-order type is filled in contextually.    
 Where it clashes with a specific entity-order type already contributed by 
the anaphor (as potentially in the case of the personal pronouns he/she/they, as 
well as one), anomaly is predicted.   
 Where it matches this value, then the resolution process may continue.   
 Where there is a small range of entity-order types already contributed by 
the anaphor (as in the case of so, for example - see (16)), then the anaphoric 
predication as a whole will be able to select the one conforming to the 
entity-order type which it compositionally specifies.    
 This general process is very similar to the way in which the selection 
restrictions of a predicate operate in the standard theory of FG (Dik, 1997a: 
§4.4) when a term is inserted in its argument position(s). 
  
3.   Consideration of the wider discourse context in which the clause is to be 
inserted will enable the anaphor’s now quite specific indexical character to 
match the properties of an appropriate referent.  I will list some of the relevant 
factors which impinge on this final stage of the resolution process here:   
 
(i)  The relative topic status of potentially matching discourse referents; 
(ii) The type of discourse connection between the anaphoric clause and the 
segment in which the candidate discourse referents were last evoked;    
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(iii) The existence or non-existence of purely syntactic conditions relating the 
two clauses, conditions which may rule in or rule out certain matching 
processes11 ; 
(iv)  The discourse status of the anaphoric clause in relation to the one where a 
candidate referent was last evoked:  that is, whether the former clause is part of 
a background or a foreground segment, or effects a “return pop” over an 
intervening background segment to a previously active foreground segment 
which it now continues, and so on. As an illustration, consider the interpretation 
of the pronouns in the last sentence of the following attested extract: 
 
(17)    ...He [Kenny Rogers] grew up with four brothers and three sisters, the son of a 
labourer and a cleaning lady, in a poor area of Houston, Texas.  “My father was an 
alcoholic, but it wasn’t disruptive because he was a wonderful man with a great sense 
of humour.  The worst he did for our family was use money for alcohol rather than 
food or clothes.  But he earned it, and had the right to get something out of life.   He 
didn’t drink for the last four years.”  His  parents were not keen on him  being a 
musician, and the early years were tough...” (Interview with Kenny Rogers, The 
Radio  Times, 7-13.8.99, p. 18). 
 
 Observe, first, that there are two discourse segments12  in this extract, an 
“outer” or containing segment where it is the journalist who conducted the 
interview who is the speaker (or “locutionary source”), and an inner, embedded 
segment corresponding to the direct speech section, where it is the interviewee, 
Kenny Rogers, who takes on the role of locutionary source.  The direct-speech 
segment is explicitly delimited graphically via the opening and closing of the 
inverted commas, and via the switch from third-person to first-person pronouns 
in reference to the interviewee.  Note also that the local discourse topics of each 
segment are distinct:  for the main discourse segment, this is ‘Kenny Rogers’, 
whereas for the embedded discourse segment, it is ‘Kenny Rogers’ father’.   
Once the direct-speech segment is terminated, it is “popped” from the highest 
position in the “focus stack” (according to Grosz & Sidner’s 1986 hierarchy of 
“focus spaces” associated with given discourse segments), and its contents are 
therefore no longer available for anaphors (here the possessive determiner his  
and the third-person pronoun him in the final sentence) to pick up. And this 
corresponds to intuition, since these two anaphors are unambiguous in referring 
to Kenny Rogers, rather than to KR’s father, the topic of the intervening 
direct-speech segment.  This is also an instance where the criterion specified in 
3(i) comes into play (i.e. anaphors’ sensitivity to topicality differences in their 
                                            
11
  See in particular Van Hoek (1997) for a functionally-oriented account of the traditionally 
syntactically-defined constraints regulating intra-clausal anaphora. Van Hoek’s work is framed within 
Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar system, an approach which has much in common with FG. 
12
  That is, basic discourse units, defined in part by their implementing a particular discourse purpose or 
goal relative to some more global discourse purpose: see Grosz & Sidner (1986) for both the term discourse 
segment  and its definition and illustration. 
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potential referents). These anaphors, in conjunction with the content of their 
host predicator and the closing of the inverted commas at the end of the 
immediately preceding sentence, effect a “return pop” to the main, interrupted 
segment, which is about Kenny Rogers himself. 
 Using (17) as a source of data for various other types of anaphor 
(specifically, the predicational it in line 3, and the first-order it in line 5, in 
addition to the instances of he and that of ø  within the embedded, direct-speech 
segment), we can illustrate how the various types of resolution heuristics 
specified above operate.  Taking first the it in line 3, this is the subject (and, 
more to the point, “external” argument - A1 in FG terms) of the adjectival 
predication “not (be disruptive)”;  as such, its denotation type would be that of a 
‘second-order’ entity, a type which is compatible with the range of entity-types 
denotable by this pronoun (as (16) indicates). Consideration of the wider 
discourse context yields the property “being an alcoholic”, which has just been 
asserted of the local discourse topic of the segment being developed (Kenny 
Rogers’ father).  Now, this property can be construed in one of two ways:  
either as an attribute (the property “being an alcoholic” qua property), thus a 
zero-order entity; or as a dynamic SoA having a duration, localisation in time 
and space, and so on.   Interestingly, it is the imposition of a second-order entity 
denotation type by the predicator (be) disruptive which selects the second of 
these two interpretation types from within this potential antecedent. Such a 
matching (the reference of it and the dynamically-construed property in 
question) yields a perfectly coherent predication when combined with the 
negated adjectival predication (NEG Xi :(PAST ei : {disruptiveAdj} (d1Aej 
:<inanimate> (ej))ø (ei)) (Xi)).   
 Moreover, the property applied to Kenny Rogers’ father of being an 
alcoholic is part of the focus space which is active at the point when the clause 
...but it wasn’t disruptive is processed, so that the pronoun it, which is 
specialized in accessing high-focus referents (see Gundel et al.’s, 1993, 
“Givennness Hierarchy”), may readily retrieve it.   
 The next occurrence of the pronoun it is found in line 5 in the clause But 
he earned it...  Here, the pronoun is the direct object (i.e. A2) of the verbal 
predicate earn, so that it is construed as denoting a first-order entity, more 
specifically (due to the sense of earn), a definite amount of money. Again, a 
referent specifically concerning ‘money’ has very recently been evoked (in the 
immediately preceding sentence), and so forms part of the focus space which is 
inherited by its following predication (through the connection effected via the 
conjunction but, and the occurrence of a pronoun, as subject of the verb, which 
maintains the previously existing topic, ‘Kenny Rogers’ father’). For these 
reasons, this second occurrence of the pronoun it is interpreted as ‘the money 
which KR’s father used to buy alcohol’, and not ‘the alcohol which KR’s father 
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used [the] money [which he earned] to buy’, which out of context is a type of 
referent which, potentially, this pronoun may well have.    
 These assignments of referents to pronouns within a naturally-occurring 
text demonstrate the crucial role in this process played by the predicator of the 
indexical predication, through its transferring to the anaphor a specific 
selectional constraint which will enable it to retrieve a suitable part of the 
currently existing discourse representation as its referent.  But this retrieval is 
by no means a direct, deterministic procedure, for as we have seen, the anaphor 
concerned, in conjunction with its immediate discourse-predicational context, is 
responsible for altering, adapting that salient discourse representation in relation 
to its new context. 
 This brief discussion has also shown that anaphora does not involve a 
relation between an anaphor and the referent of its antecedent(-trigger) (in my 
terminology), but between an anaphor and the result of the processing of the 
relevant textual segment containing that trigger: in the case of the first it 
analysed above, the pronoun is not interpreted as equivalent to simply ‘being 
alcoholic’ qua  general concept, but to ‘KR’s father’s being alcoholic during the 
period when KR and his brothers and sisters grew up’; likewise, the second 
instance of it which we examined is not interpreted as referring in general terms 
to ‘money’, but to ‘the money which KR’s father used to buy alcohol’, a much 
more specific referent.  These referents are not available at the level of text, but 
at that of discourse (see my earlier distinction between these two notions under 
(1) in section 2); thus, in order to deal satisfactorily with discourse anaphora, 
more than simply the textual record of a communicative act needs to be taken 
into account - in particular also, a discourse model, where the results of the 
earlier processing of textual segments relative to a given context and their 
integration need to be available as the further context in terms of which 
subsequent textual segments are processed. 
      
5.  Conclusion 
 
 There should be a much greater “division of labour” in the FG account of 
discourse anaphora, as between the concerns of underlying clause structure (the 
representation of anaphoric terms as well as of the relevant properties of the 
anaphoric clause as a whole), and the broader discourse context in which the 
anaphoric predication is set.   It is this dialectical relation between bottom-up 
and top-down processes which is instrumental in resolving an anaphor’s 
reference - but also in specifying its precise function within the structure of the 
discourse as a whole. ‘Prior mention’ as a condition for the existence of 
discourse anaphora has, I believe, no specific role as such to play in an account 
of this phenomenon.  Instead, the more general notion of “antecedent trigger” 
is, I would argue, required in order to bring exophora as well as indirect (e.g. 
“associative”) anaphora within the purview of this device.    
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 More elaborate specification of the various anaphor types (along the lines 
I have suggested in (16)) should be undertaken, and the semantic-pragmatic 
effects on a given anaphor of the composition of the elements making up the 
anaphoric predication need to be made explicit.  Furthermore, work needs to be 
done on the representation of discourse referents within a discourse model, 
taking account of discourse-dynamic relations such as coherence relations 
among clauses, discourse topic structures and hierarchical discourse 
segmentation.  I have attempted this for a selection of naturally occurring data 
using Asher’s (1993) Segmented Discourse Representation Theory format in 
my recent book (1999: § 5.4.3).13      
 The picture painted above does, I believe, make for a more complete and 
more realistic view of the complex domain of discourse anaphora than the 
(necessarily) programmatic account given by Dik (1997b) in chapter 10. 
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1 This article is an expanded and revised version of a paper presented at the 8th International Conference on 
Functional Grammar which took place from 6 to 9 July 1998 at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.  A slightly 
reduced version appeared under the title ‘The Functional Grammar conception of discourse anaphora: a 
(constructive) critique’ as Working Paper in Functional Grammar  nº 73, September 2000 (pp. 1-17). 
 
2 Witness the lengthy chapter 18 in vol 2 of the revised theory (Dik, 1997b), and the variety of work now being 
done on discourse-related issues - as represented in the conference at which the paper forming the basis of this 
article was presented.   See also the range of interesting work within FG on issues connected with discourse 
contained in Connolly et al. (eds.) (1997), and in Hannay & Bolkestein (eds.) (1998).   Following the recent 9th 
International Conference on Functional Grammar held in Madrid from 20 to 23 September 2000, the outline of 
a new development in the model proper is being elaborated, to be called Functional Discourse Grammar  (see 
Hengeveld, 2000). 
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3    I quote from Werth (1999: 46): “Let me at this point redraw the distinction I drew earlier [...]  between the 
terms ‘text’ and ‘discourse’, based on context.  Thus a text consists of the language itself, without taking into 
account the surrounding context.  A discourse, however, is a language event: it is the language together with the 
context which supports it.” ; and p. 302 (note the phrasing): “Analysing the discourse of which [example] (6) is 
the textual expression,...” (my emphases within the latter quotation - FC).    However, Werth does not include 
under the heading text the non-verbal features I include under it (see the text above), and does not consider a 
purely non-verbal act of communication (e.g. one conducted exclusively by means of gestures) as discourse, 
whereas I do.   
 
